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POST OPERATIVE TRANSSEXUALS’ RIGHT TO MARRIAGE 
 
By Sarah Leinicke* 
C an people born female and who identify as men, whose birth certificates and drivers licenses state they are men, and have masculine names, beards, chests, who wear 
men’s clothing, and go by the pronoun “he” marry women? 
Similarly, can people born male and who identify as women, 
whose birth certificates and drivers licenses state they are 
women, and have feminine names, breasts, vaginas, who wear 
women’s clothing, and go by the pronoun “she” marry men?  
As medical and societal understandings of gender change, 
courts are grappling with who defines a person’s gender for legal 
matters such as marriage. The medical community no longer 
considers gender a clear, simple factor determined by sex at 
birth. For example, the Merriam Webster Medical Dictionary, 
reflecting a more complicated and nuanced concept of gender, 
now defines it as a combination of behavioral, cultural and psy-
chological traits.1 In response to this change, some courts have 
found that a person’s gender was a medical factor for doctors to 
define.2 Other courts have considered gender a matter of social 
policy that the legislative branch should define.3 None, thus far, 
have determined that one’s gender is for the individual alone to 
determine. This article will examine how the definition of gender 
impacts a transsexual person’s the right to marriage.  
DEFINITIONS: THE TRANSGENDER UMBRELLA 
“Transgender” is an umbrella term for people whose gender 
identity does not conform to traditional notions of their biologi-
cal sex. Examples of transgender people include cross-dressers, 
drag queens, and transsexuals.   
Transgender people who want to change their physical sex 
characteristics, through hormone treatment and/or sex reassign-
ment surgery, are transsexuals. If they have already undergone 
hormone treatment or surgery, they are called “post-operative 
transsexuals,” as opposed to “pre-operative transsexuals.” Today, 
transgender people endure discrimination in employment, hous-
ing, health care, social services, and face disproportionate police 
harassment.4 As a result of such rampant inequity, transgender 
people are disproportionately poor, homeless, and incarcerated, 
and are 7-10 times more likely to be a victim of murder.5    
SEXUAL REASSIGNMENT HORMONE TREATMENT AND 
SURGERY 
Psychiatrists repeated attempts to treat transsexuals without 
hormones or surgery have been ineffective in combating the 
population’s high incidence of self-mutilation or suicide.6 In con-
trast, sex reassignment treatment significantly reduces suicide 
rates among transsexuals and improves their mental stability, 
socioeconomic functioning and partnership experience.7  
In order to undergo sex reassignment treatment, potential 
patients must prove they meet the requirements of Gender Iden-
tity Disorder as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Illness (DSM – IV).8 The DSM – IV has a long list of 
criteria for transsexuals, such as “persistent discomfort” in the 
gender role that causes “clinically significant distress or impair-
ment” in their work or personal lives.9 
However, despite satisfying these strict requirements, many 
people still do not have access to sex reassignment treatment due 
to the high cost of the procedure and few alternative sources to 
provide funding. Medical treatment for Gender Identity Disorder 
can cost thousands of dollars and is rarely covered by insurance 
plans. Medicare does not cover sex reassignment surgery and 
Medicaid very rarely extends coverage for the treatment.10 Fur-
thermore, all private insurance plans in the U.S. explicitly ex-
clude coverage for sex reassignment treatments.11  
Low-income transsexuals who cannot afford hormones or 
surgery are more visibly gender non-conforming and thus prone 
to employment and other discrimination. Also, people cannot 
change the gender on their driver’s licenses or birth certificates if 
they have not undergone sex reassignment treatment.12 Absent 
proper identification documents, low-income, pre-operative 
transsexuals do not have the advantages of their wealthier, post-
operative counterparts in trying to access legal marriage. For that 
reason, this article only addresses the right to marriage for post-
operative transsexuals.  
THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL MARRIAGE BENEFITS 
Post-operative transsexuals have joined queers and their 
allies in the fight to access federal and state benefits for married 
couples that are not offered in civil unions, including benefits in 
health insurance, taxes, unemployment compensation, immigra-
tion status, family leave, inheritance, and hospital visitation.13 
The marriage equality movement suffered a significant setback 
in the November 2004 elections, when many states adopted con-
stitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage. Due to re-
cent case holdings, state governments now have the responsibil-
ity to determine whether the marriage of  post-operative trans-
sexual to persons of their birth-sex falls into the category of 
same-sex marriage.   
KANTARAS V. KANTARAS: A LANDMARK CASE 
The holdings of the trial and appellate courts in Kantaras v. 
Kantaras each reflect two different perspectives on a post-
operative transsexual’s right to marry.14 The Circuit Court for 
Pasco County ruled that a post-operative female-to-male trans-
sexual’s marriage to a non-transgender woman was legal.15 The 
Florida Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court’s decision, ruling that the legislature should determine 
whether medical advancements support a change in the meaning 
of the words “female” and “male.”16 
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In 1959, Margo Kantaras was born female in Ohio.17 In 
1986, after coming to terms with her gender identity, Margo 
legally changed his name to Michael in Texas.18 In 1987, Mi-
chael was approved by the Gender Treatment Program at the 
Rosenberg Clinic in Texas for sex reassignment surgery.19 He 
underwent hormonal treatment, a hysterectomy, and a double 
mastectomy.20 In 1988, he met Linda, who was pregnant by a 
former boyfriend.21 Linda knew that Michael was a transsex-
ual.22 In 1989, Michael married Linda in Florida and adopted her 
son.23 In 1992, Linda gave birth to a daughter after undergoing 
artificial insemination with the sperm of Michael’s biological 
brother.24 Michael and Linda raised their two children together 
for nine years.25 In 1998, Michael filed for divorce and custody 
of both children.26 Linda counterpetitioned for dissolution and/or 
annulment claiming that the marriage was void because it vio-
lated the Florida law banning same-sex marriage.27 One year 
later, the Probate Court of Mahoning County, Ohio granted Mi-
chael’s request to change his birth certificate to read “Michael 
Kantaras” with the sex marked as “male.”28 
TRIAL COURT: MARRIAGE IS VALID 
In a landmark 809-page opinion aired nationally on Court 
TV, the Circuit Court for Pasco County found that Michael Kan-
taras was legally male when he married Linda and that their 
marriage was valid.29 The court also gave Michael primary resi-
dential custody of their two children.30 It was the first known 
case in the United States that included testimony from medical 
experts concerning transsexual marriage.31 Previous transsexual 
marriage cases in Kansas and Texas were pre-trial defense mo-
tions that did not include such medical testimony.32 This is an 
example of a court’s deference to medical expert testimony with 
regards to defining gender.  
The trial court’s reasons for determining that Kantaras was 
legally male included:  1) his parents and siblings observed male 
characteristics and agreed he should have been born as a boy; 2) 
Michael always perceived himself as a boy while he was grow-
ing up; 3) he completed the medical surgeries and hormone 
treatments to gain a male body and voice; 4) Linda was fully 
informed about Michael’s sex reassignment status when they 
married; 5) Michael had been accepted as a man in “a variety of 
social and legal ways,” including on his driver’s license, birth 
certificate, and in legal adoption proceedings; 6) Michael was 
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder at age 20; 7) Michael 
had no secondary female characteristics, such as ovaries, fallo-
pian tubes, or breasts; 8) the only female feature remaining on 
Michael’s body, the vagina, was not typically female because of 
an enlarged and elongated clitoris; 9) no chromosome tests were 
conducted to determine that Michael had a female chromosomal 
pattern (XX); and 10) chromosomes were only one factor in 
determining sex and did not overrule gender or self identity.33 
The trial court’s reasons for concluding Micheal Kantaras 
gender as legally male, as outlined above, focused on scientific 
advancements in gender determination that strayed from tradi-
tional notions of biologically determined gender. The court 
treated Kantaras’ gender as a matter of fact rather than a matter 
of law.34 In contrast, the Texas Court of Appeals and the Kansas 
Supreme Court had both found that post-operative transsexual 
marriage cases presented matters of law.35  
In the closing arguments of the trial court case, counsel for 
Linda Kantaras, Claudia Wheeler, cautioned against the disas-
trous consequences if the court deemed Micheal to be legally 
male. "If you open the door this much it's going to be like the 
barnyard door coming open. If Michael can be a male because 
Michael thinks he is a male, and because of some surgery, your 
Honor, then we're headed for big trouble… It will create utter 
chaos. I believe the floodgates will be opened.”36 Apparently, 
the appellate court agreed. 
APPELLATE COURT: MARRIAGE RULED INVALID 
The Florida Second District Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court decision, ruling that a post-operative female-to-male 
transsexual could not validly marry a female in Florida.37 The 
court ruled that the guidelines for transsexual marriage was an 
issue for the legislature to decide.38 “We must adhere to the 
common meaning of the statutory terms and invalidate any mar-
riage that is not between persons of the opposite sex determined 
by their biological sex at birth.”39 In its decision the court noted 
the Probate Court of Ohio, the Kansas Supreme Court, and  the 
Texas Court of Appeals decisions all delegated the issue of 
transsexual marriage to the legislature.40 
The Florida Second District Court of Appeals relied on the 
public policy view that the purpose of marriage was to procreate 
as the basis for their decision.41 The court noted that the New 
York Appeals Division voided a post-operative transsexual mar-
riage because the marriage could not produce genetic off-
spring,42 and that marriage “exists for the purpose of begetting 
offspring.”43 Thus, the court associated gender with sexual func-
tion. Since sex reassignment surgery does not enable people to 
fully perform sexual functions, the New York court argued that 
post-operative transsexuals could not fulfill this purpose of mar-
riage.44 Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court relied on sexual 
function in defining gender. The court used a 1970s definition of 
sex contained in Webster’s dictionary that males are the “sex 
that fertilize the ovum and beget offspring” and females 
“produce ova and bear offspring.”45 As a point of contrast, the 
Florida court also examined one United States case where a 
transsexual marriage was ruled valid. The New Jersey court held 
that a transsexual could marry in his or her reassigned sex if the 
person could “fully function sexually.”46 However, in the New 
Jersey case, sexual function referred to the act of having sex 
rather than to “begetting offspring.” 
Ruling that sexual function and the ability to procreate are 
requisites for marriage raises complications for other infertile 
couples, such as sterile men or post-menopausal women.47 Such 
complications underscore the inadequacy of the Florida court’s 
decision in an age where gender and sex no longer align with 
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traditional roles in procreation.  
AUSTRALIAN AND EUROPEAN COURT POSITIONS 
Michael Kantaras drew on Australian precedent to defend 
his case.48 Australia also prohibits same-sex marriage but found 
that a post-operative female-to-male transsexual could legally 
marry a woman.49 In contrast to most U.S. courts, the Australian 
Family Court recognized advancements in medical knowledge 
surrounding gender identity and found that a female-to-male 
transsexual was a man for purposes of marriage.50 
The European Court also allows post-operative transsexuals 
to marry.51 In 2002, the European Court held that the United 
Kingdom violated a male-to-female transsexual’s right to mar-
riage under the European Convention on Human Rights.52 The 
European court contrasted the stress and humiliation caused by 
the disjuncture between the transsexual person’s legal and per-
sonal lives with the impact that changing the law would have on 
United Kingdom authorities.53 The court concluded that “[S]
ociety may reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain incon-
venience to enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in 
accordance with the sexual identity chosen by them at great per-
sonal cost.”54 The European Court held that member countries 
could not bar transsexuals from marrying; however, each coun-
try could determine the specific requirements applicants must 
meet in order to be eligible for legal sex reassignment.55 
In contrast to the Australian Family Court and the European 
Court, U.S. federal courts, like the Florida Second District Court 
of Appeals, do not recognize the right of post-operative trans-
sexuals to marry.56 A Filipino man filed suit against the Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services (CIS) for denying him citizen-
ship based on his marriage because his American wife was 
transsexual.57 The woman had undergone male-to-female sex 
reassignment nearly 20 years prior.58 The Filipino man married 
the woman a year after legally entering the U.S. and applied for 
permanent resident status.59 This case is likely the first suit to 
challenge the CIS in federal court over the immigration status of 
married transsexuals.60 The U.S. federal government currently 
has no statute or regulation that addresses whether people can 
legally change their sex.61 
CONCLUSION 
At a time when scientific understandings of gender have 
outgrown traditional definitions, the societal benefits of denying 
transsexual marriage are vague. In contrast, the benefits of mar-
riage to transsexual people are clear. They would not only gain 
the traditional legal advantages of marriage, but formal and legal 
recognition of their lives as reflected on their birth certificates 
and drivers licenses – the lives they lead in their homes and in 
their jobs. The Florida District Court of Appeals called on the 
state legislature to amend marriage law if it wanted the courts to 
include post-operative transsexuals in marriage.62 The decision 
of the Florida state legislatures and other state legislatures will 
bear great implication for transsexuals and their partners. As 
Michael Kantaras’ attorney Karen Doering said during the clos-
ing arguments of the trial court case: "[Michael’s] family knows 
[that he is a man], the community knows it, and the medical 
community knows it. And now, your honor, you've been asked 
to decide whether the legal community knows that Michael Kan-
taras is a man."63 
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